Clinical Reasoning is More Than Having a Reason
Sometimes occupational therapists speak of clinical rea soning as the ability to give a reason for a clinical decision. But clinical reasoning is not necessarily equatable with the capacity to offer explicit reasons for action because, as Polanyi (1967) argued so well, even in science, we know more than we can say. Benner (1984) , Dreyfus and Drey fus (1986) , and Schon (1983 Schon ( , 1987 are among those who have written extensively about the tacit nature of profes sional expertise. Although the ability to verbalize one's practical knowledge is advantageous, such knowledge is often embodied (i.e., known in a bodily way) through our hands or our eyes and is difficult to translate into words. Words always fall short of practice.
The gap between what we can say and what we know may actually grow as we gain professional expertise. A5 we become socialized into a professional culture, much of our expertise becomes embodied in habitual ways of see ing and dealing with patients. In any culture, much of the knowledge of the members comes in the form of habits, which proVide each member of that culture with automat ic responses. Much of the fluidity and ease that we associ ate with the competent, experienced professional is a result of knowledge that has become habitual and auto matiC, that is, the professional does not have to stop and think of what to do next. The stop-and-start motion of the novice occurs, however, because at this stage, he or she does not know very much more than he or she can say. By contrast, an expert can think while doing, barely noticing the thinking process that is guiding the doing. Benner (1984) described the process of the development of pro fessional expertise as a movement from more explicit, verbally based knowledge, which is characteristic of the novice, to highly tacit and embodied knowledge, which is characteristic of the expert.
An example of tacit knowledge at a societal level is our knowledge of grammar. Most of us cannot proVide many grammatical rules to explain why we speak the way we do. Beyond the complexities of adjectives and ad verbs, many of us cannot elucidate the rules governing our language use. Yet, thiS inability to define such rules does not prevent us from using these rules with extreme competence and few errors. What may sound like linguis tic error in the adult is nearly always a cultural variation, such as black English, which is spoken with equal rule governed competence but which follows a somewhat dif ferent syntactical structure than standard English. Yet no native speakers, unless they are lingUists, have command of the rules that would allow them to give explicit reasons for why they would, for example, conjugate or choose a particular index marker in a given sentence. Similarly, in a professional culture, much of the knowledge is learned through doing, as is most language, and even where ex plicit rules and theories exist, these are often forgotten at an explicit level as they become habitually embodied in a practitioner's way of doing things.
Clinical Reasoning is More Than Applied Theory or Applied Science
Occupational therapists sometimes speak of clinical rea soning as the application of theory to practice. A ground ing in theory is essential for expert practice but does not guarantee such practice. It is what philosophers speak of as a necessary but insufficient condition for bringing about an effect. One cannot do without such a grounding, but it, alone, will not yield good clinical interventions, because theoretical reasoning differs from practical reasoning.
Theoretical reasoning is concerned with the general, with what one can reliably predict will hold true in any specific case or what will give useful insight into a broad range of particular situations. At the far end, scientific reasoning is the paradigm case of theoretical reasoning, because it is concerned with the discovery of universal relationships, especially universal laws, such as Newton's laws of physics. A good theory is useful because it gives us insights into a myriad of situations, allowing us to see a particular situation as an instance of some general cate gory or as caused by some general condition that the theory explains. Solid theoretical knowledge of neuro anatomy and physiology, for example, tells us in quite accurate empirical detail what kind of physical damage we can expect to see when someone has sustained an injury to their spinal column and what of that damage is likely to be permanent. Because this is general knowledge that holds true regardless of the particular patient, it al lows us to speak in great detail about a situation we know little about in terms of contextual specifics. This is the kind of knowledge that can be gained effectively from textbooks.
The model of scientific reasoning has guided most research on clinical reasoning in the health professions. Here, clinical reasoning is treated as applied natural sci ence. This perspective presumes that professional rea soning is a comparatively straightforward application of a knowledge and theory base -practical action applies theoretical knowledge. When occupational therapists equate clinical reasoning with the capacity of a therapist to give a reason for any particular intervention grounded in occupational therapy theory or in generally accepted medical knowledge, they are operating with this under standing of practical knowledge.
This view of clinical reasoning is also congruent with the way professional knowledge is generally understood across professions. Professional knowledge is usually characterized as applied theory (see Schon, 1983 Schon, , 1987 , for a more detailed discussion of this pOint). In the medi cally related professions, it is characterized as applied natural science (Elstein, 1976; Kassirer & Gorry, 1968; Kassirer, KUipers, & Gorry, 1982) . Medicine is conceived of as a diagnostic science in search of the hidden causes of observable symptoms and signs (Feinstein, 1973) . The assumption that clinical reasoning is applied scientific reasoning underlies nearly all research on clinical reason ing in medical fields and the informal perception of occu pational therapists, at least when speaking in a biomedi cal language.
Scientific reasoning is intended to link the concrete particular with the abstract general, ascending to the gen eral in the mode of logical abstraction, to cite Bruner (1990) . Classically, the physical and biological sciences have been understood as involVing the discovery of gen eral causes (ideally, universal Jaws) which, being general, can be predicted to produce certain effects. The presence of universally or probabilistically applicable cause-and effect relations is critical for a strongly predictive practice where effects of interventions can be anticipated and con trolled. This, of course, is the powerful form of explana tion most fully developed in the physical sciences. In explaining particular symptoms and signs by referring to an underlying disease, the clinician is explaining the par ticular by the general, revealing how particular manifesta tions have been caused by general law-governed physio logical processes. It is not surprising that this scientific model of explanation, when introduced systematically into medicine during the 18th and 19th centuries, pro duced a medical revolution. In medicine, the scientific task for clinical reasoning has been defined as the discov ery of causal relations between symptoms and underlying diseases. In occupational therapy, there has also been an equation of clinical reasoning with initial assessment, per haps because this is the clinical task most closely aligned with medical diagnosis.
Clinical reasoning has primarily been associated with diagnosis in the medical professions because within medicine, the essential clinical skill for the professional has been the ability to investigate the particular signs and symptoms evinced by a patient (which may be felt and experienced in unique ways by different patients) and to treat them as cues to a deeper level of reality, the pathol ogy. This identification allows the professional to extract from his or her repertoire of treatment interventions those scientifically proven to be effective in treating this disease state.
The concern to link the idiosyncratic particular with a general law or state of affairs (such as a disease cate gory) is related to a concern for effective intervention. If professionals can come to recognize general processes underlying particular cases, then general techniques can be designed to change those processes in predictable ways. Certainly some medical interventions work in this way. For example, if the physician learns to recognize a unique set of aches and pains as appendicitis, then he or she can perform a standardized procedure with predict able success. This procedure can be learned and applied to a 60-year-old patient in Hong Kong or to a 15-year-old patient in Cincinnati with little variation and similar re sults, Analogously, certain aspects of occupational ther apy practice can be standardized because certain aspects of occupational dysfunction can be predicted to follow from certain pathological conditions. Rogers and Masaga tani (1982) found in their research on clinical reasoning in occupational therapy that the medical diagnosis was the most critical factor influencing how therapists assessed their patients. The therapists who were studied in the American Occupational Therapy Association (AOTA)/ American Occupational Therapy Foundation (AOTF) Clinical Reasoning Study also used the medical diagnosis as an important organizer in developing their treatment plans. They linked medical diagnoses with generally ex pected dysfunctions, and these dysfunctions, in turn, pOinted them toward certain treatment activities and pro cedures. To know a person's pathology was to be able to predict with high probability what physiological difficul ties one would encounter. To be able to predict dysfunc tions meant that the therapist could also predict what interventions would improve the body.
Clinical reasoning, treated as applied natural sci ence, is reasoning directed to the practical problems of prediction and control; it is a type of instrumental reason ing. From an instrumental perspective, it is assumed that the professional's expertise is in his or her capaCity to identify and put to use the best means for achieving given ends. The professional's expertise is not in identifying those ends (e.g., better health through cure of disease), but rather, in achieving them. The professional is better able to predict what will follow from certain conditions (e.g., the disease process given current symptoms) and from particular interventions used to control the future (e.g., the effect of certain medications on the disease process). Instrumental reasoning is considered to be value-neutral concerning the best means for attaining given ends. Ends can be clearly and explicitly given prior to the reasoning process. AJthough the ends are treated as subjective givens (e.g., good health) identi fied by the values of the actor and are not considered something one can reason about (because they are sub jeCtive and value-laden), means can be strategically and neutrally identified for reaching those given ends. If clinical reasoning is defined as a form of instrumental reasoning, it is presumed to be reasoning about how to best reach explicit ends.
Instrumental rationality is derived from a positivist understanding of practical knowledge (Schon, 1983 (Schon, , 1987 . Schon (1987) described this dominant paradigm of professional rationality:
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Technical rationality is an epistemology of practice derived from positivist philosophy... 1it] holds that practitioners are instru mental problem solvers who select technical means best suited to particular purposes, Rigorous professional practitioners solve well-formed instrumental problems by applying theory and tech nique derived from systematic, preferably scientific knowledge. (p, 4) Perhaps the clearest analogy is the reasoning in volved in solving a puzzle, which is an analogy that Thom as Kuhn (1962) used in describing the reasoning of physi cists. A puzzle presents a simple world with comparatively few features that need to be attended to and with one correct answer that shows itself to be correct once it is found. Clinical reasoning within a biomedical frame is like puzzle solVing, in that a clearly identifiable correCt answer exists (e.g., a pathology, a cluster of physiological defi cits), and the player's task is to find that answer.
Given the power of theory and the dominance of the traditional biomedical model of clinical reasoning as ap plied to natural science, why do therapists say that theo retical knowledge of occupational therapy frames of refer ence, the biological sciences, and even therapeutic techniques prOVide an insufficient guide to good practice? Why does the exasperated supervisor still exhort the stu dent to "trust me" or "watch me" rather than reciting the relevant technique, rule, or theoretical concept to explain his or her aCtion' What, in other words, makes practical knowledge different from textbook knowledge or school learned technical skill?
Clinical reasoning in occupational therapy is direct ed toward action. It is much closer to Aristotle's (1985) ancient notion of practical reasoning than it is to diagnos tic reasoning or applied science as understood in pOSitiV ist terms. Practical reasoning, in the Aristotelian sense, results in action. But figuring out how to act is more than an instrumental skill. It involves deliberation about what an appropriate action is in this particular case, with this particular patient, at this particular time. This is no mere technical question. Aristotle associated the expert practi cal actor with a virtuous actor, one who is able to see rightly how to act in a given situation. Aristotle gave the simple examples of getting angry at someone or giving money to someone. Even these apparently simple actions reqUire an expertise that is more like wisdom (what Aris totle called intelligence) than mere competence, because they require the actor to ascertain what the right action should be in a given case. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aris totle wrote:
getting angry, or giving and spending money, is easy and anyone can do it; but doing it to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way is no longer easy, nor can everyone do it. Hence [doing these things] well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine. (p. 51) If this is true of lending money, how much more true is it for the therapist who is assessing whether teaching a recent stroke patient to dress himself is the right thing to be doing on a given day? The therapist must assess whether such teaching is being done in the right way, at the right time, and with the right patient. Whereas theory directs us to what is generally true, action always occurs in a unique context. The very power of theory is its general izability, but this is also its drawback. Any particular situa tion is always more subtle, always in some way new. Given the complexities and idiosyncracies of the concrete case, any theoretical knowledge is bound to be crude and ap proximate, giving a starting place but not a rule book for action. When therapists speak of individualizing treat ment, they are recognizing the same point Aristotle no ticed about good practical action -that there is always a need for judgment and improvisation in moving from general heuristics and rules of thumb to the requirements of a particular situation.
Bur there is an even more fundamental feature of clinical reasoning in occupational therapy that distin guishes it from applied science. Aristotle (1985) argued that a major part of practical reasoning includes reason ing about the nature of "the good" in a particular case. It requires that one move from general considerations about the good to a judgment about what the best good for a given situation is. For Aristotle, the good is not fixed in the way that our scientific knowledge is: "What is good and healthy for human beings ... is not the same, but what is white or straight is always the same" (p. 157).
The model of professional reasoning treared as applied science presumes that the work of the practitioner is simply to identify which means (including techniques) will best get him or her to the ends that he or she requires, hence such thinking is often referred to a means--ends rationality or technical rationality. The ends, the final goal, what Aristotle (1985) calls "the good," is not what scientific reasoning is designed to consider. In medicine, when thiS good comes into question (e.g., Should a dying patient be kept on life support systems?), it is viewed in the medical profession as a problem of ethics, which is distinguished from a problem of clinical reasoning. Aristotle (1985) , however, made no such distinction. He linked expertise in rational calculation (i.e., assessing the best means to achieve the good) with intelligence at discerning what the best good in a situation might be. He connected the need to assess the particular Situation, the ability to calculate, the need to discover the best good in a particular context, and the critical role of experience as well as general knowledge in doing so. In a brilliantly succinct passage, he stated,
The unconditionally good deliberator is the one whose aim ex presses rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a hu man being that is achievable in action. Nor is intelligence about univcrsals only. It must also come to know particulars, since it is concerned wilh action and action is about particulars. Hence. some people who lack knowledge but have experience are better in action than others who have knowledge. (p. 158) In all professions, professionals can sometimes sim ply engage in a process of technical reasoning, because the ends are not up for question. The airline pilot, for example, need not reconsider whether he or she really ought to fly to Washington, DC, if many of the passengers would much prefer Rio as their final destination. Nor does the pilot face the additional problem of calculating where to get the extra gas because a much shorter trip had been planned initially. Depending on one's perspective, occu pational therapists are either more or less lucky. They do often have the problem of reassessment while en route. Theirs is a complex practice in which they must recon sider and recalculate, often while in the midst of a treat ment session.
Sometimes reassessment takes a dramatic form. But in a small way, it is inextricably interwoven into each choice a therapist makes in a session with a patient. The follOWing example illustrates this point.
A pediatrics therapist is working with a child who is performing an activity improperly. She must decide how much to correct the child. Here is the interchange be tween therapist and child, as recorded in ethnographiC field notes: What has just happened here? The therapist decided to correct the patient the first time and then not to cor rect, but rather, validate, the patient the second time. The therapist was asked after the session how she learned to judge when to correct a patient and when not to. She said:
Il's something you learn by trial and error, by reflecting on the sessions that went badly afterwards and trying to isolate what went wrong and correcting for that {he next time. In correcting a child, you have to set your acceptable limits, have an idea of the child's limits, what you'll accept fm now, what you think they can do. A.s you gel to know them, you learn what lhey can IOlerale, how much they can stand to be corrected, and how much you have to let go for now. It varies with the kid. With some, there's always a contingency plan: "OK, five more, then we'll do some thing else."
The above example comes from the AOTNAOTF Clinical Reasoning Study. In this study, we found that therapists described such reasoning in peripheral terms, as a critical but intuitive and a theoretical aspect of prac tice. The (herapist in the above example described it as a "trial-and-error" process. It becomes evident, however, that the considerations involved in making this kind of small decision are quite elaborate. In the above example, the therapist had to refer tacitly or explicitly to a number oftheories about the child in answering questions such as the follOWing: What are the child's limits for this task, based on experience with her and other children like her? What can the child do in the context of this task? How much can the child stand to be corrected? How much do I have to let go for now?
The therapist's reasoning in answering such ques tions is based on at least five domains of knowledge: (a) her understanding of the patient's inner world of motiva tions, commitments, and tolerances; (b) her assessment of the environment in which the task is taking place; (c) her knowledge of the child's physical and cognitive defi cits and capacities and her knowledge of how to intervene with a child who manifests these dysfunctions; (d) her reading of the nature of the therapeutic relationship she has created thus far with the child and what this will allow her to ask for; and (e) her goals for the child both in the session and over a longer period that would help her judge which treatment activities she should strongly en courage the child to work hard at and which she should just "let go for now" if they appeared difficult.
This theoretical structure becomes further refined and even more elaborate in times of trouble, times when the therapist's decision does not give him or her the anticipated results. The therapist in the example above is clear that much of her learning comes from past prob lems. However, what she characterizes as a trial-and-error method appears on closer examination to be more sys tematic. What she tries is driven by theories about the patient and what the patient can handle; she is not merely experimenting randomly.
Such clinical judgment becomes extremely fine grained and necessitates an ongoing reading of subtle cues from the patient. Even the analysis I have given of the reasoning process this therapist engaged in is curso ry; it would not be difficult to continue to excavate other layers of her judgment grounded in a knowledge base of theory and experience that she drew on to make a deci sion about what to do on one Tuesday morning with her enthusiastic, erring patient.
This microlevel process of clinical judgment is al most invisible to the practicing therapist. It simply be comes part of a largely tacit thought process, a habituated expertise that allows the therapist to pay attention to relevant cues and unconsciously shift therapeutic inter ventions in response to them. The therapist in the above example probably was unaware that she was making a decision at aJJ; she was certainly surprised when I asked her to explain why she had decided to correct the child the first time but not the second. Yet this sort of clinical problem is likely to recur a dozen times within a single treatment session. Clearly, even ordinary clinical reason ing involves a level of compleXity that practicing thera pists themselves are often unaware of when they are busy trying to get from one patient to the next and to do a reasonably competent job.
Putting It All Together: Clinical Reasoning as Interpretive Judgment
The view of clinical reasoning as applied biological sci ence may explain much of the reasoning of physicians,
The American Journal of Occupational Therapy but it is an extremely problematic model when applied to occupational therapy. Even in medicine, the model of clinical reasoning as applied biological science concerned with diagnosing disease leaves out much of what physi cians actually address and think about (Mishler, 1984) . Medical anthropologists who criticize this model argue that it is based on a belief in a definite, unproblematic empirical reality-a simple world of directly observable facts. Anthropologists have labeled this the "empiricist theory of medical language" (Good & Delvecchio-Good, 1980, p. 167) .
The alternative perspective that I propose here treats clinical reasoning in occupational therapy as pri marily directed not to a biological world of disease but to the human world of motives and values and beliefs -a world of human meaning. Occupational therapists' fun damental task is in treating what medical anthropologists call the illness experience (Good & Delvecchio-Good, 1980; Kleinman, 1988) . The illness experience refers to the meaning that a disability takes on for a particular patient, that is, how disease and disability enter the phe nomenological world of each person. Clinical reasoning, taken in this sense, becomes applied phenomenology. (See Mattingly, 1991, for further discussion of this per spective in a somewhat different vein.)
The extent to which occupational therapists consid er issues of meaning qUickly became evident in the Clini cal Reasoning Study. The therapists that we studied often became involved in a host of problems surrounding chronic illness and disability that their patients viewed as profound. The most ordinary and simple of tasks -eating lunch with an adaptive fork, moving a checker piece with a mouth stick, navigating a wheelchair down a hospital corridor-often triggered deep reactions from patients as they confronted bodies that would never be the same as they once were. As every practicing therapist knows, de signing a successful treatment process for a patient goes far beyond grading tasks to increase motor and cognitive skills. It involves creating therapeutic experiences in which patients must deal with very imperfect bodies, of ten with dying bodies, and still find some reason to strug gle for a meaningful life. This is an important clinical task, one that therapists sometimes hoped to avoid but seldom could. Even the therapists who hoped to treat a hand or a memory deficit often found themselves treating much more because the patient had not just injured a hand or suffered a brain lesion but, in the process, permanently disrupted an entire life. Even when it was not written into the treatment plan, therapists found themselves haVing to help patients find some reason to continue doing their hand exercises or to bother to get up in the morning and dress themselves. It appeared that thiS level of clinical problem was both commonplace and fundamental in oc cupational therapy practice. This meant that activities like toilet transfer were seen by therapists not just in terms of skill bUilding but also in light of the patients' experiences of losing old capacities and orientations in the world and of the meaning of their learning new ways of orienting themselves.
Before he died, the anthropologist Robert Murphy (1987) wrote an autobiographical account of his own ill ness experience, a degenerative disease caused by a spi nal cord tumor that had left him paralyzed from the neck down. He noted the difference he experienced between his treatment by neurologists and by rehabilitation spe cialists. He was struck with the irony that neurosurgery and clinical neurology were among the most prestigious medical specialties, whereas rehabilitation medicine ranked among the lowest. The irony was that neurology, as Sacks (1984) also noted, is a passive science because neurologists can only examine and diagnose. Rehabilita tion, conversely, is an active science in which both patient and therapist work together to discover the patient's real limitations and to continually try to transcend those limi tations. Because of the problems occupational therapists tackle, they deal not only with physical ailments but also with the patients who have them. Murphy (1987) experienced rehabilitation therapy as a kind of game in which therapists were "urging, cajol ing and nagging" (p. 50) him and his fellow patients to push harder than they felt able and in which "today's painful overreach may become tomorrow's routine ac complishment" (p. 50). In rehabilitation, patients are very much involved in their own recovery. They must claim their disability rather than separate themselves from it. The powerful autobiographical accounts given by vivid and informed writers like Murphy and Sacks (1984) about their own experiences of disability, as well as the everyday talk of patients to their therapists, emphasize the assault to one's sense of identity that deep injury to the body causes. To become disabled is to become disembodied alienated from one's own body. Therapists' efforts are directed, in part, toward a patient's reembodiment -a reclaiming of the body -and this involves helping the patient to articulate a new sense of self.
The phenomenological body is one that therapists encounter repeatedly in attempting to carry out their practice with real patients. The therapists we studied were drawn into the phenomenological world of their patients by the way they worked with them. The meaning that the patient ascribed to an illness entered directly into the therapeutic process, because this process is bUilt on a practice of "doing with" the patient. This reqUired thera pists to devise treatment goals that were meaningful enough to the patients that they were motivated to work hard as partners in the therapeutic process. The thera pists thus found themselves constantly confronted with the interpretive task of translating between their way of seeing and the patients'. If the goals the therapist pur sued were too far afield from the patient's perception of their functional needs, therapy was likely to be stalemated.
Therapists also continually referred to their interpre tations of patients' meanings to modify treatment direc tions or attempt to persuade patients to see their disabil ity in a different light. They often saw possibilities where patients saw none and commonly attempted to help pa tients fight despair and passive reSignation in the face of their disabilities. Murphy (1987) , commenting on his own resistance to therapy and his enormous depression as he faced a deteriorating body, noted that" [rehabilitation] therapists must breach imposing psychological barriers to reach their patients and enlist their cooperation in the long tedious process of reconstructing their bodies" (p. 54). Effective therapy requires that patients be committed to a long path where gains are so slow they are difficult to perceive or are counteracted by a faster rate of deteriora tion. This means that therapists must address the prob lem of motivation. They must tap into commitments and values deep enough within patients to commit them to such a process. No matter what the technical and physio logical expertise and orientation of the therapist or what practice theories he or she relies on, effective collabora tion reqUires treatment of the disability as more than a biomechanical issue that can be separated from the pa tient's experience.
In the hospital setting, where patients are not in the middle of ordinary lives, doing with patients often means haVing patients care for themselves as much as possible. Occupational therapists in the Clinical Reasoning Study often told us, "Nurses do for patients. We help patients do for themselves." "Good nurses" were defined as those with the patience to let the patient do what he or she can. Doing with patients also means haVing patients practice exercises in the hospital during the times when they are not being seen by the therapist. Patients are asked to take an active role in their treatment, in contrast with the more passive role that they generally assume as patients.
Even when therapists would like to ignore the pa tient as a whole person, the cooperative nature of the practice compels them to acknowledge the patient's meaning world at some level in order to devise strategies for inducing the patient into taking the therapy seriously. Clinical reasoning in practice means reasoning not only about what is wrong and how to fix it but also about how to engage the patient in that fixing process. This, in turn, necessitates that therapists understand enough about the meaning of the disability from the patients' perspectives to develop a shared account of what fixing the problem could amount to in terms of their lives. Even therapists who prefer to avoid delving into a patient's life and try to restrict their practice to more narrowly construed physio logical problems find themselves taking on the whole person, because the quest for collaboration makes this unavoidable. If therapists cannot succeed in getting the patient to collaborate with them, they may discontinue treatment. For example, one therapist told the staff in a planning discharge meeting, "If Leo doesn't make some treatment goals, I'm going to discontinue therapy." If therapy is going to work, patients must form an alliance with the therapist and agree to play their part in the therapeutic effort.
But if clinical reasoning in occupational therapy is fundamentally applied phenomenology because thera pists treat disability as an illness experience that radically alters a person's life, then the model of clinical reasoning as applied biological science must be modified. Perhaps the most important misfit with the applied science per spective concerns individualization of treatment. The therapist must continually tailor therapeutic interven tions to the life situation of the patient. This ongoing improvisational tinkering process is evident in the exam ple of the pediatrics therapists given earlier. From a phen omenological or meaning-centered perspective, disabil ities are always unique because they injure and shape each person's life in unique ways. Furthermore, an under standing of the uniqueness of the person's response to disability is integral to effective therapy.
If the patient is to do for himself or herself as part of treatment success, then learning to read the context be comes a key clinical reasoning task for the therapist. The example of the pediatrics therapist in this paper illus trates perfectly the ongoing interpretive efforts that char acterize competent clinical reasoning in occupational therapy.
Often, the need to understand the context becomes most evident during the treatment process. Whereas pri or studies of clinical reasoning in occupational therapy have focused on assessment, and much of the concern to improve practice or incorporate theory into practice has evidenced itself in the development of assessment tools, a study of actual practice reveals that it is often during the process of treatment rather than initial assessment that the thorniest clinical problems present themselves. Be cause therapists need patients whu are committed to the treatment process, if their pictures of what clients need are greatly mismatched with the patient's perceptions of his or her needs, trouble arises. This mismatch is less likely to show itself during assessment than during treat ment, when therapists are actively asking patients to do for themselves any number of tasks that the patients may find emotionally threatening and embarrassing or phys ically painful and difficult. If the patient does not sec the same need to undergo a treatment program that the therapist does, therapy becomes stalled. Therapists get stuck and must begin to decide how to shift tactics or find out more about their patients in order to involve them in therapy.
One important implication of the fact that clinical reasoning in occupational therapy is so dependent on the reading of particular contexts is that it is more difficult to standardize practice in the fonn of uniform techniques and rules. The expert therapist continually modifies goals
The American journal oJ Occupational The,'apy and procedures to meet the individual needs of the par ticular patient. From an interpretive perspective, the rela tion between an initial clinical condition and a final clini cal outcome tends to lose any quality of a simple, rational, and straightforward application of a scientifically in formed treatment plan; instead, it emerges as a compli cated and infinitely more quirky interactive process among any number of critical actors (e.g., patients, fam ilies, other staff) as they come to know each other, try to establish trust, and manipulate each other for their own ends.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued for an alternative to the medical model of clinical reasoning. This alternative is an interpretive, or meaning-centered, model that focuses on how patients make sense of their disability and its mean ing for their individual lives. I have claimed that such a model of clinical reasoning is more appropriate than the traditional medical model, which is built on the biological sciences and focuses on the physical impairments associ ated with disability. And yet it is clear from the Clinical Reasoning Study that many aspects of what therapists do fall well within the biological science framework. Thera pists look at range of motion. They ask clients to stack cones, lift weights, balance their trunks, and put pegs in a pegboard. Even more complex, or life-related, treatment activities are often carried out by therapists in a physically focused way. For example, many of the self-care actjvities that therapists ask patients to do may concentrate more on the physical aspects of developing skills than on any deeper meaning that patients may attach to learning how to dress or feed themselves. The medical model, with its focus on the physical body, does not shed some light on clinical reasoning in occupational therapy. But it also pre sents problems in describing the thinking of therapists hecause it leaves so much out, and what it leaves out is fundamental to good practice. The clinical problems that are systematically most difficult for therapists are those that fall within the phenomenological domain, yet these have been given the least amount of attention in the education of therapists, Attention to the meaning-centered nature of much clinical reasoning in occupational therapy reveals the depth of the clinical problems therapists face on a daily basis. What may look trivial from a purely physical point of view (e.g., How can strengthening an arm compare to open heart surgelY?) is not necessarily trivial from a phe nomenological point of view. Often, health professionals unfamiliar with occupational therapy notice the usual paraphernalia of occupational therapy practice (e.g., backgammon boards, bright plastic balls, oddly shaped forks and spoons) and assume that occupational therapy is a trivial practice. Therapists complain of being called "play ladies," of being seen as versions of physical thera pists somehow assigned to the upper extremities or of being expected to keep patients occupied when they be come too bored in institutional worlds. The danger of such characterizations is not merely the politics with oth er professional colleagues. It is also the insidious way in which such identifications can be internalized, and thera pists can begin to see themselves in a reductionistic way. Therapists can come to reduce their practice to a manipu lation of the physical body, forgetting how much their interventions are directed to a person's life.
Perhaps occupational therapy as a profession needs to take its phenomenological tasks more seriously. Al though concern with a patient's experience of disability derives in part from deep beliefs that belong to occupa tional therapy's professional culture, the phenomeno logical perspective, from which illness and disability are treated as meaningful experiences, is quite neglected as an articulating and legitimizing framework for practice. Occupational therapists are trained much more system atically in the biomedically related sciences that provide them with a way of seeing the biomechanical body. They are reqUired to take courses in anatomy and physiology, in biomechanics and neurology. Such courses form the core of their education. There is no such core of courses to equip occupational therapists to treat the phenomeno logical body. Students learn little or no philosophy, soci ology, anthropology, or psychology of disability as an illness experience, except incidentally in less pedagogical ly emphasized, clinically oriented courses designed to teach skills in group leadership and in the therapeutic use of self. If therapists continually reason about the meaning of a disability for a patient's life, their professional under standing of themselves should reflect this aspect of prac tice. Perhaps occupational therapy needs to expand and rework its professional language, introducing constructs from the interpretive social sciences, to better encompass the work therapists actually do in the course of treating patients. A
